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FOREWORD
In Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for
Success: A Proposed Human Capital Model Focused upon
Talent, Colonel Casey Wardynski, Major David Lyle,
and Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Michael J. Colarusso
made their case for the importance of accessing,
developing, retaining, and employing talented leaders.
In this current monograph, they go deeper and explore
the differences between competent and talented leaders
as well as discussing what talents the U.S. Army should
seek in its officers. More importantly, they examine
the consequences of failing to create an officer talent
management system.
As the authors point out, the Army is competing
with the private sector for the best talent America
has to offer. It is therefore prudent for Army leaders
to consider the principles set forth in this second in a
series of six monographs analyzing the development
of an officer corps strategy.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
For years, the U.S. Army has given “competency”
pride of place in its officer development doctrine. In
popular usage, competent means having requisite or
adequate ability, and in a labor market context, it is
defined as “an enduring combination of characteristics
that causes an appropriate level of individual
performance.”1
Recent operational experience, however, clearly
demonstrates the need for something more than
adequate or appropriate individual performance by
leaders. In an era of persistent conflict, Army officers
must embrace new cultures, serve as ambassadors and
diplomats, sow the seeds of economic development
and democracy, and in general rapidly conceptualize
solutions to complex and unanticipated problems.
These demands require the Army to access, retain,
develop, and employ talented officers, not competent
ones. This distinction is more than a mere parsing of
words. In our view, talent is the intersection of three
dimensions—skills, knowledge, and behaviors—that
create an optimal level of individual performance,
provided the individual is employed within his or
her talent set. We believe that all people have talent
which can be identified and liberated, and that they
can dramatically and continuously extend their talent
advantage if properly incentivized, developed, and
employed.
To get optimal performance from its officers,
however, the Army must first acknowledge that
each has a unique distribution of skills, knowledge,
and behaviors. It must also acknowledge the unique
distribution of talent requirements across the force.
Doing so will allow the Army to thoughtfully manage
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the nexus of individual talent supply and organizational talent demand, leaving behind industrialera assignment practices that treat leaders like
interchangeable parts and creating a true talent
management system that puts the right officer in the
right place at the right time.
Of course, talent management is a means to an end,
not an end in itself. An officer strategy focused upon
talent has but one purpose: to help the Army achieve
its overall objectives. It does this by mitigating the
greatest risks: the cost of a mismatch between numbers
of officers and requirements; and the cost of losing
talented officers to the civilian labor market.
Whether it likes it or not, the Army is competing
with the private sector for the best talent America has
to offer. The domestic labor market is dynamic, and in
the last 25 years it has increasingly demanded employees who can create information, provide service, or add
knowledge. The Army cannot insulate itself from these
market forces. It must change the relationship between
its officers and their strength managers from one that
is relatively closed, information-starved, slow-moving,
and inefficient, to one that is increasingly open, rich
in information, faster moving, and thus far more
efficient.
We believe that thoughtful, evolutionary changes
can produce revolutionary results. The Army can
transform its officer management practices from an
almost feudal employer-employee relationship to
a talent-based model through a series of relatively
low-risk efforts. Following our previous monograph
and this the second one, we shall continue with four
follow-on monographs for a total of six devoted to the
subject of talent in the Army Officer Corps. In the latter
four, we will examine in much greater detail each of
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the four components of our officer labor model, viz.,
accessing, developing, employing, and retaining
talent. We will recommend specific, low-risk, low-cost,
strategically important changes. Though evolutionary
in nature, they can collectively engender revolutionary
effects and move the Army toward a viable officer
talent management strategy. Only then will it be able
to access, develop, employ, and retain the officer talent
it needs to manage risk in the face of uncertain future
requirements.
ENDNOTE
1. Lyle Spencer in Lance A. Berger and Dorothy A. Berger,
eds., The Talent Management Handbook, New York: McGraw-Hill,
2004, p. 65. Our definition is derived from Spencer’s.
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TALENT:
IMPLICATIONS FOR A U.S. ARMY OFFICER
CORPS STRATEGY
No two persons are born exactly alike. . . . All things will be
produced in superior quantity and quality, and with greater
ease, when each man works . . . in accordance with his natural
gifts.
			

Plato, The Republic, 360 BC

INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Army has long cherished and consistently
trumpeted the need for competent officers. One needs
to look no further than the description in Field Manual
(FM) 6-22, Army Leadership: Competent, Confident, and
Agile. The foreword begins with “competent,” the
introduction repeats it, and by the end of the manual,
the word has been used another 63 times.1
Of course, few people would tune into a television
program called America’s Got Competency. Call it
America’s Got Talent, however, and you have the
makings of a hit show. A common dictionary definition
of talent is a special natural ability or capacity for
achievement. Competent, on the other hand, is defined
as merely proficient or having requisite or adequate
ability. There is nothing wrong with that, but it is little
wonder that talent has greater popular appeal.
Americans generally will not pay to see a competent comedian. They do not want their favorite
sports franchises to sign merely proficient outfielders
or quarterbacks. They are uncomfortable leaving
their retirement portfolios in the hands of adequate
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investment brokers, and they avoid auto mechanics
with mere requisite abilities. Americans want, and in
fact demand, talent.
This demand becomes even more strident in
professions where anything less means life or death.
Take, for example, the case of U.S. Air Flight 1549,
which ditched in the Hudson River on January 15,
2009, shortly after take-off from LaGuardia Airport.
This successful water landing by Captain Chesney
Sullenberger saved the lives of all 155 passengers
and crew and was quickly dubbed the miracle on the
Hudson. Sullenberger was lionized in the press and
celebrated in Washington.
Why all the fuss? It was because Captain
Sullenberger’s performance wildly exceeded any
reasonable expectation, and he did something a merely
competent pilot simply could not do. In a matter of
seconds, he correctly diagnosed the ramifications
of a double bird strike, calculated the distance to
nearby airports, factored in altitude and population
concentrations, and applied the fundamentals of
physics to safely land that plane. Training alone could
not have assured such an outcome. In a highly complex,
fast-moving, and uncertain situation, the talented
Sullenberger was able to figure it out.
The nature of their profession demands that
officers be able to figure things out just as well as
Captain Sullenberger did. The Army has always
sought to develop technically and tactically competent
leaders, and officer evaluation reports routinely assess
these competencies. Recent operational experience,
however, clearly demonstrates the need for something
more. Officers must embrace new cultures, serve as
ambassadors and diplomats, sow the seeds of economic
development and democracy, and in general rapidly
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conceptualize solutions to complex and unanticipated
problems.
This is why America’s sons and daughters must
be led by talented officers. When teachers lack talent,
students do not learn; when car salesmen lack talent,
their showrooms stay full; but when Army officers
lack talent, Soldiers die unnecessarily and the nation’s
security is imperiled.
CONTEXT—HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY
A thorough understanding of talent and its
implications for a U.S. Army Officer Corps strategy
is grounded within the broader context of human
capital theory. In his seminal book on the subject,
Nobel Laureate Gary Becker argues that employees
gain human capital (the ability to produce value in the
workplace) through education, training, experience,
and medical care, thus increasing their productivity.2
This increase, however, presupposes two conditions
that are not always met: first, that the employees are
good ones focused upon being as productive as possible;
and second, that the employees are working within a
competency area that aligns with their human capital.
Michael Spence, another Nobel Laureate, created
a useful job-market signaling model. It concludes
that the first condition often goes unmet due to bad
(unproductive) employees, highlighting the need
to continuously screen, vet, and cull for talent.3 This
is particularly important in limited lateral entry
organizations such as the U.S. Army. The second
condition, the misalignment of human capital with the
demands of the work place, also requires significant
effort from large organizations with varied requirements like the U.S. Army. We believe that market forces
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can dramatically improve that alignment and even
convert many bad employees into good ones. And by
good, we don’t mean competent. We mean talented.
In most human capital literature, the concept of
talent is handled obliquely at best, with contending
notions regarding which employees are actually in
the talent pool. One recurring argument makes talent
synonymous with an organization’s highest worth
individuals. In their 2003 work, The Talent Management
Handbook, for example, Lance and Dorothy Berger
characterize these individuals as “Superkeepers,” just
3 to 5 percent (by their estimation) of the credentialed,
professional employee pool. Superkeepers merit high
degrees of investment and training so that they can rise
in their organizations to eventual executive leadership.
In essence, this talent management concept is focused
largely upon succession planning for a select few,
rather than upon maximizing the performance of all
employees. This approach is fairly common throughout
the literature.
Less common, but also present in the literature, is
the viewpoint that we advance here: that all people
have talent which should be identified and liberated,
and that they can dramatically and continuously
extend their talent advantage if properly incentivized,
developed, and employed. Underpinning this view
are works such as Howard Gardner’s Frames of Mind:
The Theory of Multiple Intelligences (1983), or Thomas
Armstrong’s 7 Kinds of Smart: Identifying and Developing
Your Multiple Intelligences (1999).4
Armstrong, for example, defines intelligence as
“the ability to respond successfully to new situations
and the capacity to learn from past experiences.”5 He
argues that employees can increase their market value
and productivity if they identify and develop their
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talents within each of several native intelligence sets
first articulated by Gardner: linguistic; spatial; musical;
bodily-kinesthetic; logical-mathematical; interpersonal; and
intrapersonal.
Our definition of talent is informed by these
elements, but takes a more comprehensive approach.
We contribute to the existing literature on talent by
introducing a new structure that captures the various
dimensions of talent, seeing it as a distribution, and
placing it in the context of a strategic labor model.
Our Definition of Talent.
We define talent as the intersection of three
dimensions—skills, knowledge, and behaviors—that
create an optimal level of individual performance,
provided the individual is employed within their talent
set. Figure 1 illustrates how the many views of talent
boil down to these three key dimensions.

Figure 1: The Dimensions of Talent

5

Moreover, we espouse the critical concept that each
person’s talent set represents a unique distribution
of skills, knowledge, and behaviors, and that each
organization in turn has a unique distribution of
individuals. For an illustration of this concept,
consider Figure 2, whose inset shows one individual
with relative breadth of skills, depth of knowledge,
and both depth and breadth of behaviors. Next, look
at the graph for the entire organization, which has
a distribution of individuals from A to Z. Person A,
with a higher curve, has greater depth of talent, while
Person Z, with a wider curve, has greater breadth of
talent. By seeking a distribution of officer talent with
varying breadth and depth, the Army essentially buys
an insurance policy against the uncertainty of future
requirements.

Figure 2: Distributions of Talent
Furthermore, carefully managing the intersection
of these distributions can dramatically enhance organizational efficiency and success. Integrating this talent
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concept throughout strategic-level efforts to access,
retain, develop, and employ people can create incredible synergy. It is as if the team suddenly gets smarter,
faster, and more cost-effective, and productivity
zooms.
Although our views have been formulated within
the context of the Army’s officer labor model, we believe
our distillation of talent into three equally important
dimensions, distributed across both individuals and
organizations, is widely applicable. Understanding
how organizations can integrate these concepts into
their own human capital strategies requires a deeper
examination of the three dimensions of talent.
Skill. In our previous work on the subject, we describe skill as ranging from broadly conceptual or
intuitive to deeply technical. We place a premium
upon aptitudes for rapid learning and adaptation,
reason, perception, and discernment, plus the ability
to conceive solutions to unanticipated challenges.6
We also argue, however, that people manifest these
aptitudes most powerfully in the fields to which their
intelligences draw them.
For example, people with a high degree of
logical-mathematical intelligence may be drawn to
civil engineering, where they will be able to think
conceptually, learn rapidly, and respond effectively
to unanticipated challenges, just as those with highly
developed linguistic intelligence might perform in the
field of journalism. Ask two such people to exchange
professions, however, and their productivity may
plunge as the journalist wrestles with structural tension
and the civil engineer struggles with split infinitives.
As Bruce Tulgan writes in Winning the Talent Wars
(2001), the unique talent of every employee highlights
the need for “creating as many career paths as you

7

have people.”7 No two people possess an identical
talent distribution, and as a result employees cannot
simply be treated like interchangeable pegs to slot
anywhere. Each person’s talent set is unique and
multidimensional, more like a jigsaw puzzle piece
than a peg. While it takes longer to fit the puzzle piece
into its proper position than it does to stick the peg
in a hole, the up-front effort is worth it. Puzzle pieces
are interlocking, creating powerful bonds within a
cohesive whole (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: Work-Force Talent Matching
The size and scope of the U.S. Army workforce
make it a complex puzzle indeed, and to accomplish its
mission, it needs a broad distribution of talent. Breadth
affords the Army the flexibility it needs to adapt to an
environment with ever-changing requirements. Breadth
is only one dimension of talent, however. Organizations require depth as well. Take, for example, Mariano
Rivera of the New York Yankees, one of baseball’s
preeminent relief pitchers, and Albert Pujols of the St.
Louis Cardinals, power hitter extraordinaire. Each has
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a unique distribution of talent that must be aligned
against his team’s requirements. Other than being
consummate professionals, they bring fundamentally
different talents to bear—Rivera could no more lead
the league in home runs than Pujols could in saves.
Each of these athletes possesses highly specialized and
developed talents that are central to the success of their
organizations.
While each professional baseball club clearly needs
specialization, each also needs broadly talented utility
players. Imagine the results if a team fielded nine
specialists like Rivera and Pujols, or nine utility players.
Such an approach would land them squarely in last
place. To make a run at the pennant, a team needs a
rich distribution of talent, both deep and broad, and the
management strategy to fit the puzzle pieces together
correctly.
This talent distribution concept is somewhat
foreign to the Army’s officer management culture.
Standardized training and promotion gates are
designed largely to create officers of one type. Given
the uncertain requirements of the future, however,
the Army needs a rich distribution of broad and deep
talent.
Knowledge. The acquisition of knowledge represents the further development of a person’s several
intelligences, and is thus an extension of their talent
advantage. While some knowledge is, of course,
acquired via training and life experience, education
provides the most important source of knowledge
because it also bolsters mental agility and conceptual
thinking. It allows people to extract MORE knowledge
from their life experiences. Education teaches people
how to think, not what to think. They more rapidly
assess unanticipated situations and formulate courses
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of action leading to desired outcomes. They gain
decisionmaking courage stemming from increased
confidence in their own cognitive abilities. In other
words, one of the best defenses against uncertain future
requirements is an educated labor force.
Consider, for example, an emergency in which a
person requires immediate medical assistance, yet
only a veterinarian is available. The vet is likely to be
logical-mathematical, with a talent advantage extended
by years of education. His medical talents might not be
ideal for the situation, but his ability to conceptualize
medical problems and extrapolate solutions to unanticipated circumstances could save the day. Seem
far-fetched? Tell that to Ian Bennett, an English farmer
recently saved by his veterinarian, Dr. Ed Bulman, after
suffering a heart attack while the two of them tended
to a flock of alpacas on a remote farm.8
Popular culture abounds with stories showing the
impact of education and knowledge acquisition upon
a person’s talent set. A useful example is the Adam
Sandler movie, Happy Gilmore. In the film, Happy is
drawn toward several jobs requiring bodily-kinesthetic
intelligence because he possesses it in good measure.
After striking out as a janitor, gas station attendant,
plumber, and construction worker, his innate intelligence eventually draws him toward hockey. He
fails to make the team, however, and ends up moving
in with his grandmother while contemplating his next
career step.
An accidental encounter with two lazy moving men
helps Happy to finally discover one of his abilities—he
is a talented golfer and can drive a ball farther and truer
than anyone on the PGA tour. Despite this, Happy
does not become an above average performer until
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he begins working with a former professional who
educates him in the rules of the game. The pro also
teaches Happy how to putt, dramatically extending his
talent advantage in golf and making him a top earner.
While the movie has a happy ending (of course),
employers should definitely try to avoid the Happy
Gilmore effect for two reasons. First, Happy discovered
his talent set accidentally, whereas employers must
systematically develop people to their fullest potential
and against specific requirements. Second, Happy’s
full potential as a golfer went unrealized because he
could not conform to the sport’s required behavior,
as evidenced by his club throwing and shouting
obscenities. Happy’s experience illustrates that the
right proportion of skills, knowledge, AND behavior
are critical to creating and maintaining a person’s
talent advantage.
Behavior. Effective organizations hire not merely
for technical and cognitive skills, but also for values,
attitudes, and attributes that fit their culture.9 The U.S.
Army has certainly developed and sustained a powerful organizational culture. Its seven official values
(Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity,
and Personal Courage) are the most visible, but the Army
ethic demands dozens of other personal attributes
(will, tolerance, compassion, caring, character, candor,
punctuality, sobriety, faithfulness, fiscal responsibility,
accuracy, courtesy, etc.). For Army service, particularly
commissioned officer service, these attributes are
essential.
Screening for behavioral fit is more than just values
and attribute matching. Officers who live the Army
Values, graduate at the top of their class, and can
“shoot, move, and communicate with the best of them”
will be far less effective leaders if they are conceited,
inflexible, go-it-alone types. Put another way, when an
11

organization seeks behaviors that fit its culture, it is also
seeking teamwork behavior, marked by the respectful
sharing of goals and knowledge with others.
Jody Hoffer Gittell, a professor at Brandeis
University, defines teamwork behavior as relational
competence—the ability to relate effectively with
others.10 By others, she is referring not only to fellow
employees, but to an organization’s partners and
customers. In the U.S. Army’s case, others obviously
include fellow Soldiers and the American citizenry, as
well as host nation populations and joint, interagency,
intergovernmental, and multinational partners.
Gittell describes teamwork behavior as critical
to relational coordination, a “mutually reinforcing
process of interaction between communication and
relationships carried out for the purpose of task
integration.”11 This process is particularly critical in
an age of increasingly complex, highly interdependent
tasks. In other words, the right behaviors lead to timely,
accurate, and problem-solving communication which,
when coupled with the right skills and knowledge,
creates higher-performing organizations.
Gittell developed and tested her relational
coordination theories in the context of health care,
long-term assisted-living care, and the airline industry.
The test case perhaps most useful to our discussion
is her study of Southwest Airlines. This company of
over 31,000 employees enjoys industry-leading success
in workforce quality (measured via profitability
and customer satisfaction) and workforce retention
(measured via annual turnover rates). It is a talentfocused organization looking for highly skilled and
knowledgeable employees, yet it routinely screens
out highly credentialed applicants lacking relational
competence. It does this not simply because It wants
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a happy workforce, but because it wants an efficient
and productive one. Southwest believes it is difficult to
make up for hiring mistakes in the training process—
team players are needed.12
As teamwork has always been a core component
of the Army’s institutional culture (“I will never leave
a fallen comrade”), it is critical to access, develop,
employ, and retain officers with behavior that fits the
Army. By fit, we emphatically do not mean an Army
of clones who behave identically and with robotlike
efficiency. Shared values and teamwork behavior
still leave plenty of room for individual styles and
personalities.
Aligning the right mix of skills, knowledge, and
behavior against each work requirement can shift the
production possibility frontier of an entire organization
up and out. Figure 4 shows how the Army can increase
its production of firepower and humanitarian assistance
with no increase in costs. Conversely, by aligning talent
with requirements, the Army can continue to maintain
humanitarian assistance and firepower along the old
frontier, but with cost savings.14

Figure 4: Talent Management Can Lead
to Increased Production
13

We can summarize our discussion of talent thus far
as follows:
1. Talent is the intersection of skills, knowledge,
and behaviors, and everyone has it.
2. Each individual has a unique and evolving
distribution of talent (his/her talent set)—some deep
and some broad.
3. Optimal production occurs when organizations
thoughtfully manage depth and breadth of talent over
time.
MANAGING TALENT
Assuming that an organization is doing a good job
of bringing in talented people, those making significant
contributions are most likely working in the right
positions on the right tasks. Those who are producing
less are probably in the wrong place, doing the wrong
things. Instead of disposing of them, the organization
may benefit by finding a better fit for them. Getting
the right person in the right place at the right time is
not an end in itself, however. Talent management has
but one purpose: to help an organization achieve its
overall objectives.15
Leading management scholars argue that the
fundamental challenge facing employers in today’s
economy is the misalignment of talent supply and
demand and the risks associated with it. Peter Cappelli,
a professor at the Wharton School, describes the
problem in terms of cost:
The greatest risks in talent management are, first, the
cost of a mismatch in employees and skills (not enough
to meet . . . demand or too much, leading to layoffs)
and, second, the cost of losing your talent development
investments through the failure to retain employees.
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These risks stand in the way of the ability of your
organization to meet its goals.16

Over the last 2 decades, the Army’s Officer Corps
has certainly confronted these two risks, the former
during the draw-down period of the 1990s and the
latter from the late-1990s to today.17 The Army still relies
upon talent pipelines to develop organization men and
women who will remain with the Officer Corps for their
entire careers (see Figure 5). This practice is increasingly
difficult in today’s labor market, however. As the last
decade has clearly shown, talent pipelines designed
to take officers from company grade to general officer
level will inevitably leak talent, sometimes severely.

Figure 5: Army Officer Human Capital Model
Of these risks (overproduction, underproduction,
and leakage), Cappelli identifies talent overproduction
as most dangerous. In his view, overproduction fills
an organization’s bench with employees who become

15

increasingly disgruntled and seek opportunities to
get in the game elsewhere, creating a negative work
environment that depresses productivity everywhere. In
other words, overproduction can create talent leakage
that becomes contagious within the workforce. The
Army may have experienced this phenomenon with
the recent over-accession of lieutenants, as shown in
Figure 6. As lieutenants receive less time in key and
developmental jobs such as platoon leader, they are
more apt to find employment outside of the Army
where their talent sets will be valued.

Figure 6: Authorized Strength and Inventory
for All Officers
Cappelli feels that underproduction, also a genuine
risk, is a lesser evil, as companies can always turn to
free agent talent to fill labor gaps (in short, poaching
talent from other organizations, or buying talent).
He concludes that in the current labor market,
organizations can mitigate risk in two ways: first, by
combining internal talent development and just-intime talent buying to fill unexpected gaps; and, second,
by becoming far better at forecasting talent demand.
16

Of course, the Army’s competitive category officers
cannot be purchased from outside because the very
nature of the profession makes lateral entry to its
core competencies infeasible.18 General Electric and
International Business Machines are not producing rifle
platoon leaders or cavalry troop commanders that the
Army can hire into its ranks. Faced with this reality, the
Army turned to internal talent poaching, pulling more
and more senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) into
the Officer Corps via Officer Candidate School (OCS),
with a potentially deleterious effect upon both its NCO
Corps and its Warrant Officer Corps.19 The Army has
recognized this problem and is actively taking steps to
end its over-reliance upon internal talent poaching.
The quandary remains, however—if the Army
overproduces officer talent, it risks engendering
job dissatisfaction that accelerates talent flight. If it
underproduces, it is again short of talent with nowhere
to turn. Therefore, the Army must attack its talent
management risks with a thoughtful and effective
mitigation strategy that keeps its talent supply and
demand in careful balance at all times. Beyond relying
on education and broad talent sets to mitigate risk, the
Army must also make significant changes in officer
management policy, practice, systems, and culture.
REVOLUTIONIZING THE ARMY OFFICER
CORPS
We believe that thoughtful, evolutionary changes
can produce revolutionary results. The Army can
transform its officer management practices from those
of an almost feudal employer-employee relationship
to a talent-based model through a series of relatively
low-risk efforts.
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First, the Army needs to create an internal officer
talent labor market. In our follow-on papers in this
series, we will provide specific recommendations on
how the Army can meet this need. Second, the Army’s
human resource culture must change. It should
stop managing officers as interchangeable parts,
acknowledging that each possesses unique talents
suiting them to a particular position at a particular
time. Embracing this concept requires the Army to
move away from its current industrial-era rotational
employment concepts. It must develop flexible
management practices that capitalize upon the unique
skills, knowledge, and behaviors of each officer rather
than expecting each officer to adapt to the constraints
of an inflexible system.
These changes cannot take place until the Army
accurately determines which skills, knowledge, and
behaviors currently reside within its officer corps. To do
this, new information technology systems are needed
to capture very granular insights into each officer’s
talent set, which in turn will reveal the distribution of
officer talent across the Army. Current personnel data
systems may be able to tell us that an officer attended
Notre Dame and studied anthropology, but they do not
reveal that while in college, the officer also participated
in a semester abroad program in Saudi Arabia and
wrote a thesis on tribal ancestries in Middle Eastern
countries. Furthermore, current Army information
systems contain scant information on an officer’s skills,
knowledge, and behaviors.
Cataloging available talent is not enough, however.
The Army must also know what its current and future
talent requirements are. While requirements forecasts
are never going to be foolproof, the Army has to try
to make them far better than what others have done,
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that is, to forecast talent demand dynamically and
accurately, and to keep supply in sync with that
demand. As Cappelli has pointed out, dynamic
forecasts, which are continuously updated, have a
smaller margin of error than long-range forecasts.
Information technology solutions, accompanied by
the appropriate changes in operational policy, can do
much to create both accurate forecasting and a robust
internal market. When forecasts are wrong, as they
inevitably will be, previous investments in education
will help the organization adapt quickly to fill gaps.
Once the Army finally knows the talent it possesses,
it must continuously assess it. An effective mix of skills,
knowledge, and behaviors is not static in individuals
nor in organizations. The theoretic construct of
screening, vetting, and culling for talent, introduced
by us in the first monograph,20 plays a central role in
this continuous process. It provides the Army with a
mechanism by which it can continually prune its talent
to meet evolving requirements. Such a mechanism for
continuous assessment is particularly necessary in the
Army’s Officer Corps for at least three reasons.
First, many of the skills, knowledge, and behaviors
that make lieutenants most productive will not be
sufficient to make them talented colonels or generals
later in their career. For example, colonels and generals
(the Army’s strategic talent segment) require a greater
breadth of competencies than field grade (core talent
segment) or company grade (requisite talent segment)
officers. In one of the follow-on monographs, we shall
discuss ways to develop talent across the continuum of
a career.
Second, the global operating environment is dynamic, continuously demanding new competencies
from the Army’s Officer Corps at all levels of employment. An equally dynamic domestic labor market
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compounds the challenge. The last 25 years have
witnessed a dramatic increase in the U.S. demand
for employees who can create information, provide
service, or add knowledge. The Army cannot insulate
itself from these changes. It must convert the relationship between its officers and their strength managers
from a “relatively closed, information-starved, slowmoving, and inefficient relationship to one that is
increasingly open, information rich, faster moving,
and thus far more efficient.”21
Third, the way that each generational cohort learns
and performs, as well as what it values and how it
behaves, is as distinct from the one preceding as it is
from the one following. As officers rise to leadership
within the Army’s strategic talent segment of colonels
and generals, they will successfully manage the
talents of their junior officers and Soldiers only if
they understand, and make adjustment for, these
generational differences.22
If the Army first understands the dynamic nature of
the changing market for officer talent, it can thoughtfully decide which developmental programs best fill
the gap between the talent it has and that which it
requires. In so doing, the Army can begin to employ
its talent with an eye towards productivity and future
development of every individual’s talent set.
CONCLUSION
We believe that talent is something possessed by
everyone. It is the intersection of three dimensions—
skills, knowledge, and behaviors—that can optimize
the performance of every individual, provided they are
employed within their talent sets. Each organization
has a unique distribution of individuals who in turn
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possess a unique distribution of skills, knowledge, and
behaviors (their personal talent set). Achieving optimal
organizational performance entails managing talent so
that the organization attracts the right talent, develops
it, retains it, and employs it most efficiently.
In a series of four follow-on monographs, we will
examine each component of our officer labor model in
much greater detail: accessing, developing, employing,
and retaining talent. We will recommend specific,
low-risk, low-cost, evolutionary practices that can
collectively engender revolutionary change. Such
change is necessary to move the Army from industrialera personnel practices to information-age talent
management practices.
Whether it likes it or not, the Army is competing
with the private sector for the best talent America has
to offer. Remaining competitive in this labor market
requires an Officer Corps strategy that can access,
develop, employ, and retain the talent the Army needs
to confront future uncertain requirements.
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